If Hestern 1\trope fails , .1m1ever, the future proL:.i.scs little more than an extension of the decade o!: f'"'ar t.1rout;h wnicl ue have just passed.
Sooner or later, in t .. e years ahead lies inevitable war, an age of chaos and an er.largemcnt of t.1e totalitarian void \.J'1ic}]. already spreads over va:.;t areas of the globe. It is possible that the price of failure rray even be the extinction of human life itnelf .
I l~ve deliberately stated the c.~lloncc to ~Urope in the positive terms of unity ratLer than in tern:.S of defense against the conlJnunist threat as it is usually defined. I do so witu a full awareness of the destructive implications of cor;:munism. Feu movements in :listory .P.ave been more erosive of the foundations of our civilization.
The grouth of totalitarian communism, hollever, is more a measure of the \·ICakness of the free nations, particularly in :!estern Europe, than of the inherent strength of tile Co!Jl.munist ideolOGY. I think it essential to recognize and to empl.asize this distinction. Failure to do so, is to concede the superiority of totalitarianism over freedom as a motivator of nankind, a concession wLich I , for one, cannot nake.
Cor:r.ll!lism has intensified t e need for ...llro ca. ii tet7ation witnin the larcer cor..1mi..L."' li ty of f!"ce nations . It ·-·s .i.g :lie .t t, C1 .11 of unity tnat cot:.fronts toe west. . Dut only a drulJero s rdc-rea<.tir.g of :1istory would sucgcc t that cor:.z:ru.nist: crca tnd t. I.e d . ....ven if cow:.n.mirt pressures suould abate, as they well rriJ.y co for t.1o mOJ,el t , t1. urGent ll<;CC:Jsity for unity would renain.
Twice in t .. is centur-J, our cjv:£.lization has skirted tl,e edge of doom.
'1\:ice our heritac;e ,as been tossed rccklo~sly into the fires of war . Both conflicts bce&n wit..tin .iestern .~:.urope aml both spread groat darracc in that region . Coinimminm fed on these co!:'lflacr.J.tious . ftor the war:; hac burned themselves out, the col'll:llnists probed anong tl'-' c1.· .rred and s100klng :ruins .
'l'ltey tore do\/n nations and icc.:als \!!uc:1 Lad Lean :>tNCl'cly \.Tcakcncc.l by t.1e conflicts ; soue mi3ht have been salvagod Lad they not boon subj(;cted to this second onslaug, t . 'l': at is tue destructive role w.r.ich cor:1l7ll.lnism occupios in the contemporary world and He roust not lose sight of it. By the same token, \1owev(;r, it is essential not to pernit this destructiveness to oLscure the fact that ti1e greatest caJW.ge to the free nations has been largely sclf-inflictedo It has resulted froLl their o'm inner disunity, and particularly tho disunity of the ~/estern European region.
Both great wars of this century, in tile first instance uere atteupted suicides on the part of \iestern Europe. The critical danger of corumunism came after, not before, these massive assaults which the regi on launched upon itself. And only as a way is found to cope l-Tith tendencies of this kind will the free nations develop real security against communinm and other forns of totalitarianism.
The most daneerous of these tendencies is associated Hith the inability of modern Gernany to find a stable place in the common destiny of l/estern properlJ be called t ' at , was i'r01n a hope not an actuality. Vie'l-tcd in this light, the present agreements ere not necessaril.r a step away from unity.
They may yet prove to be a step towards it.
'i'he apeed with which ;. Gert:lUlly is a ereater dar.gcr to peace than a Ge:n::l!ll'ly with soue cepaci t: to defend itself.
In t!1c London-Per· s accords, lies tern Europe no"r has a plan for \!est Connan rearmament with certain safeguards. A neu German netional army of 500 , 000 men "ri 11 join those of other continental po\lcrs u11der the l!ATO commander in the common defen3e of the \lest. \:estern Germany pledr;cs never to employ these forces to chance existing frontiers or to achieve
Wlific~tion with eastern Germ~y .
There are tectnical safcgua.rds aGainst a resUl·c;ent Genncn Itili tarism in these accords ,.rhich take the form of maxiiiiUI:\ level of forces and prohibitions on the manufacture of certain types of offensive arm.;:.ments :in Germany. Perhaps the most significant deterrent houever , is that provided by the United Kingdom . The British have committed 4 divisions and a tactical airforce to the m.llnland of Europe. In f' .• doinc; they have clearly bound their future uith that of the continent for the f'rst time in centur:ics.
It was a tr~~scendcnt decision and they made it couraceously ~~d unequivocally.
For the first time in modern history the three r;reat po\-lers in the core of Europe--the United Kir_gdo:n, Gei"'!Ulny c.nd FrD.nce--uill be linked in specific arrancements for the col:l!llon defense . The::>e ties are reinforced by the pledges of continuing concern in Europe 's future Hhich the President and Secretary of State have made on behalf of this co~~try . fartnershiR, I am elad to say, is nov the keynote in our relations \.fi th the :!estern European countries .
That , in bare outline is the substance of the London-Pari s accords .
In pvYt , the significance of the agreements lies in the provision they make for the c~~ation of 12 German divisions . I do not mean to suggest that this increase in the armed po\-/er of Hestern Europe \Jill be decisive in discouraging a massive Soviet assault on that area . :e· have a right to ; nsi st that the Cerma..r1s seek their unification peacefully and patiently, with full recognition that Hhat is at stake is not only their ot-m future but the future of the entire continent; in short , that they continue to follot-1 the course t-1hich has been set by Adenauer .
So lone as they C.o so , the '·!est Germans Harrant the full support of \~estern Et.:.rope and ourselves in the· r queGt for un.ifi c::ttion tri th their eastern provinces. :·or is it sufficient jn our policies to pay lip service to the principle of unification . Jt, is por.sible t h't the Soviet Unio'l l'!'ay be impelled to accept genu · no Ger man un · r · cation l.Jy a rising tido of publi~ insiotonce in Gormru1y r.nd by other pres:3Urcs . A developmcn1, of th · s k · nd ho\lcver, \.till not como c.n:-3 'ly.
It i::> likely to appear only i!' the policy of the est German government ru1d tho "estern po\'crs \TitL :-espect to U!'lif ' cat · on o just , restrnined and co!'lpnssionate .
In the pursuit of such a policy, ti~e can be on the side of the free nations. There are indications that the to/eight of disunity , disillusion and discontent is being felt on tho communist side . That this Europe ; it is necessary throughout the uestern world; it is desirable uith all nations who are free to cooperate Hherever they may be on the g:obe .
On my return .Lrom F.uropE: several months ago, I reported to the Fore:i.gn In doine so , I run u• .
•arc that mo3t free nations arc in a rolat · vcly prosporous state , but that is precisely the tine to act to avert a collnpse.
And ~~ cc . 1ic collap~e could be the shoal on which the hope for unity world , a leadership of free men who will not concede that any part of the humrun race , regardless of its present status is forever beyond the re~ch of liberty. :re shall see , in short, the beginning of a ne'\or cycle and I trust a peaceful cycle , in the never-cndins strugele bett·Teen tyranny and freedom . This cycle ,.,ill belons to freedom .
